











Turrini, Paolo. (2016) Endogenous games with goals : side-payments among goal-directed 
agents. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 30 (5). pp. 765-792. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/97659                
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9304-
6  
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Endogenous games with goals:
side-payments among goal-directed agents
Paolo Turrini
the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later
Abstract Boolean games have been developed as a paradigm for modelling soci-
eties of goal-directed agents. In boolean games agents exercise control over propo-
sitional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might
require the opponents’ cooperation. The presence of agents that are goal-directed
makes it difficult for an external authority to be able to remove undesirable prop-
erties that are inconsistent with agents’ goals, as shown by recent contributions
in the multi-agent literature. What this paper does is to analyse the problem of
regulation of goal-direct agents from within the system, i.e., what happens when
agents themselves are given the chance to negotiate the strategies to be played
with one another. Concretely, we introduce endogenous games with goals, obtained
coupling a general model of goal-directed agents (strategic games with goals) with
a general model of pre-play negotiations (endogenous games) coming from game
theory. Strategic games with goals are shown to have a direct correspondence
with strategic games (Proposition 1) but, when side-payments are allowed in the
pre-play phase, display a striking imbalance (Proposition 4). The effect of side-
payments can be fully simulated by taxation mechanisms studied in the literature
(Proposition 7), yet we show sufficient conditions under which outcomes can be
rationally sustained without external intervention (Proposition 5). Also, integrat-
ing taxation mechanisms and side-payments, we are able to transform our starting
models in such a way that outcomes that are theoretically sustainable thanks to a
pre-play phase can be actually sustained even with limited resources (Proposition
8). Finally, we show how an external authority incentivising a group of agents can
be studied as a special agent of an appropriately extended endogenous game with
goals (Proposition 11).
1 Introduction
One of the key objectives of Artificial Intelligence is that of devising interaction
platforms for distributed computational entities pursuing different, when not con-
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flicting, design objectives (Castelfranchi, 1998). As a consequence of this, the effec-
tive handling of conflict in agents’ societies is of tremendous importance to achieve
desirable systemic properties. More often than not, however, a centralised off-line
design type of solution (Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), where useful social laws
are determined before the interaction starts and computational entities can be
guided towards their pursuit, is not always an option (Walker and Wooldridge,
1995), and the field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence has come up with a num-
ber of decentralised solutions, elsewhere called from within the system (Walker and
Wooldridge, 1995), involving computational entities that are able to negotiate and
agree on locally desirable properties (Rosenschein and Genesereth, 1985; Davis and
Smith, 1983). Disciplines such as Distributed Problem Solving (Davis and Smith,
1983), Computational Social Choice (Chevaleyre et al, 2007), Automated Nego-
tiation (Jennings et al, 2001; Endriss et al, 2006) — to mention a few — are all
attempts to develop endogenous solutions for regulating potential conflicts among
artificial agents, by for instance allowing them to exchange information, cast a
ballot, engage in a discussion and so forth.
A well-known model of a society of goal-directed artificial agents investigated
in AI is boolean games (Harrenstein et al, 2001), a compact and computationally
well-behaved representation of strategic interaction by means of logical formulas.
In boolean games agents exercise control over propositional variables and strive to
achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the opponents’ cooperation,
disregarding the cost associated to each action, if need be.
Recently a theory of incentive engineering has been devised (Wooldridge et al,
2013), where an external authority, i.e., the principal, steers the outcome of the
game towards certain desirable properties, by imposing a taxation mechanism on
the agents that makes the outcomes that do not comply with those properties less
appealing to them. However, the task of the principal turns out to be a non-trivial
one as, due to the structure of the so-called quasi-dichotomous preferences, there
is no monetary compensation that can convince agents to give up their goal. In all
the other cases, though, agents behave as cost-minimisers and desirable systemic
properties satisfying agents’ goals have been shown to be implementable by the
appropriate system of incentives.
The present contribution1 stems from a complementary perspective and stud-
ies, instead, how games with quasi-dichotomous preferences can be transformed
from within the system, by endowing agents with the possibility of sacrificing a
part of their payoff received at a certain outcome in order to convince other agents
to play a certain strategy. Concretely, we introduce endogenous games with goals,
1 This paper is based on (Turrini, 2013), but it significantly extends it, overcoming a number
of its limitations, generalising all its results and adding new ones. In details, while (Turrini,
2013) studied the framework of boolean games, this paper studies a generalisation thereof,
strategic games with goals, which avoids the somewhat unnatural assumptions on which
the original models were based - as we make clear later on when comparing boolean games
with strategic games with goals; while Turrini (2013) studied unbounded side-payments only,
this paper studies the possibility of bounded side-payments, i.e., players have budget con-
straints, but still allowing for the unbounded case; while Turrini (2013) studied updates by
side-payments using an ad hoc adjustment factor, the endogenous games with goals studied
here avoid that complication. This paper, unlike Turrini (2013), extensively motivates the use
of quasi-dichotomous preference relations and presents a significantly larger number of formal
results - with full proofs - on both the static (without side-payments) and the dynamic (with
side-payments) models.
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obtained coupling strategic games with goals, a generalisation of boolean games
to a full-blown model of goal-directed agency, with the machinery of endogenous
games coming from game theory (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005). We illustrate our
idea and, informally, our setting in the following example.
Energy sharing in block world Consider two robots, Ann and Bob, and a heavy
block in front of them. Ann and Bob can, together, lift the block and, once lifted,
move it to the left. The block is such that only the coordinated action of both
robots would lift it and, possibly, move it. Let us assume that each robot can
independently decide whether to try and lift the block and, once lifted, try and
move it. Robots are programmed to achieve a desired state of affairs and, let us
assume for the moment, endowed with enough battery power to allow them to
perform all sort of tasks. In particular, let us assume Ann wants to have the block
lifted and moved to the left, while Bob simply wants to try and lift the block,
so he does not really care whether the block ends up being actually lifted or it
will be moved once lifted. Try and lift the block costs Ann 5 units of energy,
while it costs Bob 10. Try and move the block left, once lifted, costs Ann 3 and
Bob 10. As a general rule, when confronted with the choice of achieving a state
satisfying their design objective or achieving a state that does not, Ann and Bob
will always go for its satisfaction, disregarding energy consumption. When instead
goal satisfaction is not an issue and the choice is between two outcomes satisfying
the goal or between two outcomes not satisfying it, then our robots will always
opt for the least expensive course of action.
It goes without saying that in a scenario of this kind Bob will try and lift the
block. But, being indifferent between trying and move the block left and staying
put once the block is lifted, he will then simply look at the resulting energy costs
and decide to stay put. Ann, instead, would like to see the block lifted and moved
left, but she knows that, once the block is lifted, Bob will not make an effort to
move it. Therefore, confronted with the choice between making an effort to try
and lift the block and not to move at all, she will opt for the latter. In the end,
Bob will have his goal satisfied, consuming 10 energy units, while Ann will not,
consuming 0 energy units.
Suppose though that robots were connected to each other by an energy channel,
which would allow them, before any action has yet to take place, to commit to
bear a part of the effort the opponent is undertaking at a certain outcome, should
that outcome be reached. This is simply implemented by first allowing the robots
to promise each other a certain amount of battery power as a function of the
outcome of the game, and then by having a mechanism to enforce these promises
once their actions are taken.
While in the previous scenario Ann, although depending on Bob for the real-
ization of her goal (cfr. (Bonzon et al, 2009a,b; Ben-Naim and Lorini, 2014) for
a qualitative account of dependencies in boolean games and (Grossi and Turrini,
2012) in strategic games), could not have any say on Bob’s decision-making, now
she can adopt a richer strategy and, before Bob takes any decision, offer him, say,
20, for trying and move the block left. In the resulting situation both Ann and Bob
will have their goal satisfied, Ann consuming 28 units of energy and Bob consum-
ing nothing, which is a more satisfactory solution for both. Notice, however, that
the solution is not stable, as Ann has an incentive to deviate to more parsimonious
offers in the pre-play phase without compromising the realization of her own goal.
4 Paolo Turrini
This paper analyses scenarios of this kind, where goal-directed agents can over-
come undesirable properties of an interaction by undergoing a pre-play negotiation
phase, offering to bear a part of their opponents’ costs, should some particular
course of actions been taken.
The added value of the analysis presented here, intuitively introduced in the
example above, is two-fold:
– it complements the framework of incentive engineering for boolean games
(Wooldridge et al, 2013), studying those situations in which agents can reach
desirable properties without external intervention;
– it provides a quantitative resolution to dependence relations (Castelfranchi
et al, 1992; Grossi and Turrini, 2012), broadly studied for the case of boolean
games (Bonzon et al, 2009a,b; Ben-Naim and Lorini, 2014), allowing agents to
influence each other’s decision-making by the offer of monetary incentive.
We carry out the analysis studying the general setting of endogenous games
with goals, in relation with both boolean games and endogenous games, focussing
on the properties of the resulting equilibria.
Paper Structure In Section 2 we introduce strategic games with goals, studying
their formal connection with strategic (normal form) games coming from game-
theory. In Section 3 we study endogenous games with goals, adding to strategic
games with goals the dynamics brought into play by the possibility of exchanging
side-payments in the pre-play phase. In Section 4 we carry out an equilibrium
analysis of these structures, showing results of pure strategy equilibrium survival
and discussing the connection with what known from game theory. In Section 5
we integrate side-payments with taxation mechanisms, devising a procedure that
ensures desirable properties to be reached, even when the possibility of making
transfers is limited. Section 6 discusses related literature, paying particular atten-
tion to the formal relation with boolean games, while Section 7 presents possible
extensions of the framework. Finally, in Section 8 we wrap up the work pointing
to possible future research directions.
2 Strategic games and quasi-dichotomous preferences
In this section we describe a general approach to characterizing goal-directed ar-
tificial agents acting in a common shared world. We do so by explicitly enriching
a strategic game with a distinguished set of goals, one for each agent.
As well-known, a strategic (normal form) game S is a tuple (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi),
where N is a set of agents, each Σi a set of strategies for agent i ∈ N and
pi :
∏
i∈N Σi × N → R a payoff function, assigning to each agent his payoff at
each strategy profile. Henceforth we abbreviate pi(σ, i) as pii(σ),
∏
i∈N Σi as Σ,
— extending the conventions to similar cases — and denote NE(S) the set of
pure strategy Nash equilibria of strategic game S, with NE∆(S) being its mixed
extension.
Strategic games with goals are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Strategic games with goals)
A strategic game with goals G is a tuple (S, {Gi}i∈N ) where S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi)
is a strategic game and each Gi ⊆ Σ is a set of goal states for agent i.
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Intuitively a goal is a state of the game the agent is directed to and, when given
the possibility, would not want to trade for a non-goal state, no matter what the
payoff assigned by the function pi is.
If we think of each agent as associated to a colour, we obtain a particularly
intuitive representation of strategic games with goals, where goal states for each
agent are assigned the agent’s colour. The algebra of goal states is defined by
operation on colours, e.g., a goal state shared by a blue agent and red agent is
represented as a purple state. Figure 1 is an example of how strategic games with
goals can be displayed.
L R
U 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Fig. 1 Agents’ goals. Column wants the game to end up in the set {(L,D), (R,D)}, Row
in the set {(R,D)}. The coalition {Column,Row} wants the shared outcome (R,D) to be
realised. As a convention, Row obtains the first component in the displayed payoff vectors,
Column the second.
Example 1 Our starting example can be modelled as a strategic game with goals2
The set of agents is {Ann,Bob}, each having the same set of strategies, representing
the subsequent combination of their atomic actions: (lL), where she tries and lift
the block and once lifted to move it left, (lN ) where she stays put, and finally
(nL) and (nN ) representing strategies starting with her not trying and lift the
block. We will regard the robots’ strategies that do not lift the block as utility-
equivalent for an agent, i.e. identical for decision-making purposes, as moving the
block to the left can only be brought about on the condition that the block itself
is lifted. Combination of strategies by each agent represent our strategy profiles,
upon which both goals and payoffs are formulated. The strategic game with goals
depicted next, where Ann is the red row agent and Bob the blue column one,
models our scenario.
We have not yet provided the tools to analyse Figure 2 at a formal level.
However some intuitive considerations can already be made. For instance, if we
disregarded goals, the outcomes at which agents do nothing would be the only
stable and rational ones. If we instead consider goals, we can see that Ann is not,
alone, able to satisfy her own goal, while Bob is, by simply trying and lift the
2 As the reader will have noticed, the example might, possibly more realistically, be modelled
making its temporal dimension explicit. Robots are, in fact, involved in an extensive form of
interaction, being able to lift a block and once lifted moving it somewhere. We can use strategic
games without loss of generality, though. As well known (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994), each
extensive form game can be canonically represented as a strategic normal form game, where
the history-based strategies in the former can be encoded as one-shot strategies of the latter.
A more subtle point concerns the choice of the solution concept, as subgame perfection, rather
than Nash-equilibrium, is usually thought to be a more adequate tool for the analysis of rational
play in extensive games (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). In normal form games this boils down
to requiring a Nash equilibrium outcome to survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. This requirement can be incorporated in our framework by substituting the set
of Nash equilibria NE∆(S) with the set of Nash equilibria surviving iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies IEWDS(NE∆(S)). None of the point we are making here would
be affected by this modification.
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lL lN nL nN
lL −8,−20 −8,−10 −8, 0 −8, 0
lN −5,−20 −5,−10 −5, 0 −5, 0
nL +0,−20 +0,−10 0, 0 0, 0
nN +0,−20 +0,−10 0, 0 0, 0
Fig. 2 Ann, Bob and the block. The costs agents incur in as a result of interaction are modelled
as negative payoffs.
block. Also, Bob would rather not perform any action once the block is lifted, as
it would mean paying 10 more for no gain in terms of goal satisfaction. All these
considerations show the presence of an asymmetric structure of interdependence
among the agents, where Bob enjoys a stronger position.
To understand which outcomes are game-theoretically rational and which ones
are stable in strategic games with goals, in other words, to do equilibrium analysis,
we will need to construct a utility function which faithfully incorporates the intu-
itive difference between goals agents have and resources spent or gained by them
at each given outcome.
2.1 Quasi-dichotomous preferences
Consider a drone that is programmed to destroy enemy headquarters. If several
courses of actions ensure the target to be destroyed, the drone is required to
choose the least expensive one in terms of, e.g., casualties. The drone strategy
is constructed in such a way that an outcome where the target is destroyed will
always be preferred to an outcome where the target is not destroyed, no matter
how many casualties will be involved.
Being able to construct entities that prioritise goals such as the drone we have
just described, notice, does not force us to commit to a world in which all agents
have priorities on goals. However, we maintain that the very existence of such a
machine forces other entities, e.g., humans, to form beliefs about agents having
that type of preferences. 3 In any case, using priorities we can technically allow
other entities, e.g., humans or other drones 4, to be purely utility maximisers or
cost minimisers, by simply setting the goal-states to be the empty set, or the set
of all outcomes.
In this paper we certainly do not intend to provide a descriptive model of hu-
man behaviour, which should be backed by appropriate experimental findings, but
we point out that quite a few accounts in cognitive psychology show how human be-
haviour can be more easily explained in terms of attainability of objectives rather
than sole utility maximisation. Examples are the Maslow’s theory of hierarchi-
cal needs (Maslow, 1943), according to which human decision-making prioritises
the attainment of basic drives (e.g., hunger drive) before addressing the others
3 I am thankful to Marcus Pivato for pointing to this fact.
4 We could reprogramme our drone in such a way that it aims at destroying the target
only if it does not involve the killing of a thousand casualties. What we are doing now is to
construct a machine that assigns a negative utility to the killing of casualties that can actually
compensate failed target destruction.
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(e.g., differences in styles of hair-dress) 5; Herbert Simon’s model of satisfacing
decision-making (Simon, 1957); and most modern accounts of human risk-taking
in lotteries, such as Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
We stress it once more, in our account goal states represent those outcomes
that allow for no compensation in terms of secondary rewards. A goal state is better
than a non-goal state, and will remain so, no matter what the payoff associated to
the secondary reward is. When goal realization is however not an issue, secondary
aspects play a role and the agent will always try to maximise the resulting payoff.
This fact induces what is technically called quasi-dichotomy of a preference
relation (Wooldridge et al, 2013). For decision-making purposes we need however
to make a choice on how to actually implement it in a fully formal way. The
first that comes to mind is that of working with truly lexicographic preferences
(Rubinstein, 2006), i.e., states being identified with a tuple (x, n) where x ∈ {0, 1}
and n ∈ R, the first entry encoding whether the state is a goal state or not and the
second entry encoding secondary materialistic aspects. Therefore, a state z is to
be preferred to a state z′ whenever z ≥LEX z′, where ≥LEX is the lexicographic
order between the two. Under this interpretation, goal states are de facto assigned
an infinite payoff, which makes them better than a non-goal state no matter what
the payoff of the latter is.
Lexicographic orders on outcomes do not however have a corresponding von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation (Wilson, 1996; Knoblauch, 2003; Blume
et al, 1991; Rubinstein, 2006) and the resulting games do not in general display
fundamental game-theoretical properties, such as existence of Nash equilibria 6.
To overcome this difficulty we introduce a purely technical device that, intu-
itively, allows us to treat infinite utility as extremely big utility. This is enough to
make the structures we work with game-representable, without however modify-
ing the goal-directed character of agents’ decision-making. Concretely, we define
a family of boost factors Ωi, one for each agent i, each of which encodes how much
more a agent values a certain goal state with respect to a non-goal state. In other
words, a boost factor is a measure of the relative distance that, at each game, a
certain goal state for an agent finds itself with respect to all other non-goal states.
Notice that boost factors are mechanisms to ensure that goal states remain better
than non-goal states, but they implicitly also give a measure of the risk that a
agent is willing to undertake to achieve a goal state, i.e., they encode a preference
relations over mixed profiles containing both goal states and non-goal states.
For a given strategic game with goals G = ((N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), {Gi}i∈N ), let Rpii =
{x ∈ R | pii(σ) = x, for some σ ∈ Σ}. Technically, a boost factor is a function
ωGi : Rpii → R associating to each payoff how much this payoff is boosted if it is the
payoff of a goal state. Each ωGi is required to be such that:
5 The examples of drives come directly from Maslow. In (Maslow, 1943) he emphasises the
fact, which is fully taken up in our account, that humans have superficial needs, attempting the
satisfaction of which is conditional to the attainment of the basic needs. Basic and superficial
needs can, in turn, have inner hierarchy, i.e., the famous ”Maslow Pyramid”.
6 Technically, a preference order representing lotteries over outcomes which are lexicograph-
ically ordered does not satisfy the axiom of continuity, it does however satisfy the axioms of
monotonicity, simplification of compound lotteries and independence Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994).
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ωGi (x) ≥ ωGi (y) if and only if x ≥ y (1)
Intuitively, a goal state with associated payoff x is at least as good to i as a goal
state with associated payoff y if and only if x is at least as high as y.
ωGi (x) > pii(σ) for all σ 6∈ Gi (2)
In other words, a state satisfying a goal is always better than a state not
satisfying it.
A strategic game with goals G associated to a profile of boost factors ω ∈ Ω =∏
i∈N Ωi is said to be instantiated by ω, and this is denoted G(ω). Intuitively,
when playing G(ω) each agent i judges the betterness of goal states according to
the boost factor ωi. Here is the definition of utility taking them into account.
Definition 2 (Utility) Let G(ω) be a strategic game with goals instantiated by
a profile of boost factors ω with G = ((N,Σ, pi), {Gi}i∈N ). The utility function
uG(ω) : N × Σ → R assigning to each agent the payoff uG(ω)i (σ) he receives at




ω(pii(σ)) if σ ∈ Gipii(σ) otherwise
So, the function u is constructed by the combination of pi and ω, i.e., the payoff
function and the profile of boost factor, respectively. The latter takes care of the
fact that goal states are always better than non-goal states, no matter what the
payoff is associated to the latter by the function pi.
We would like at this point to clarify the possible conceptual ambiguity that
might arise from having two different functions, pi and u, which associate a vector
of numerical values to each outcome. The function pi, which we will always refer
to as a payoff function, encodes the secondary, intuitively purely monetary, aspects
of a certain state. The function u instead, which we will always refer to as a
utility function, incorporates the primary aspects, i.e., goal realization, possibly
associated to a state. Thereby, a state might have (relatively) high utility and
(relatively) low payoff, if for instance the state satisfies a goal, but it might also
have (relatively) low utility and (relatively) high payoff, if for instance it is the
only state not satisfying a goal. In the end, what the agents look at when taking a
decision is the utility function which, in our case, is built upon the payoff function
and the goal states.
It is also worth noticing that boost factors allow us to reason about hypothetical
utility distributions, e.g., by comparing expressions such as ω((N,Σ,pi),{Gi}i∈N ) and
ω((N,Σ,pi
′),{Gi}i∈N ). This extremely important feature will be fully exploited later
on, as the role of boost factors is not only to declare that goal states are better,
but, again, to keep them so independently of any monetary compensation.
For a given strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ), with S = (N,Σ, pi), and
instantiated with boost factor profile ω, the induced strategic game is the game
S′ = (N,Σ, u), where u is calculated according to Definition 2.
Figure 3 shows how.
Endogenous games with goals 9
L R
U −3,−3 0,−5
D −5, 0 −1,−1
L R
U −3,−3 0,−5
D −5, 1 3, 0
Fig. 3 From a strategic game with goals to its induced strategic game: each agent’s boost
factor assigns +3 to all his goal states with respect to his best non-goal state, maintaining
the relative distance among goal states. For example, the reason why Column is getting 1 at
outcome (D,L) of the induced strategic game is because he is getting 0 at outcome (D,R) —
which is in turn because −3 is the payoff of his best non-goal state and −3 + 3 = 0 — and the
original relative distance between (D,R) and (D,L) is of 1.
2.1.1 Expected Utility
We introduce an extra novel feature with respect to the standard treatment of
boolean games: we allow agents to randomise over possible strategies. This will
make it possible to draw a comparison with the equilibrium existence results known
for endogenous games, which rely on Nash’s theorem, the well-known result on the
existence of Nash equilibria with mixed strategies in normal form games (Nash,
1950). As usual, we first denote ∆(Σi) the set of probability distributions over the
strategies of agent i and, for δ ∈ ∆(Σi), we denote δ(σi) the probability that mixed
strategy profile δ assigns to σi ∈ Σ. We call the set s(δ) = {σi ∈ Σi | δ(σi) > 0}
the support of δ.
Definition 3 (Expected Utility)
Let δ be a mixed strategy profile available at strategic game S with a payoff
function pi, σ ∈ s(δ) a pure strategy profile in the support of δ, and δ(σ) the






To compute the expected utility on a strategic game with goals, instantiated
with a boost factor, we compute the expected utility in its induced strategic game.
Example 2 Consider again our starting example and assume now that each agent
values a goal state 10 units more than each non-goal state, keeping the relative
distance among them. More precisely, the game is instantiated by a family of
boost factors {ωAnn, ωBob} such that for each σ ∈ GAnn — the case of Bob is
symmetric — ωAnn(piAnn(σ)) = piAnn(ρ) + ϕ + 10, where ρ = maxσ′ /∈GAnnpii(σ
′),
and ϕ = maxσ′∈GAnn(piAnn(σ)− piAnn(σ′)). The matrix next shows how the game
is transformed, with payoffs and goals replaced by a standard utility function
induced by the family of boost factors.
lL lN nL nN
lL 10, 10 −8, 20 −8, 0 −8, 0
lN −5, 10 −5, 20 −5, 0 −5, 0
nL 0, 10 0, 20 0, 0 0, 0
nN 0, 10 0, 20 0, 0 0, 0
Fig. 4 Ann, Bob and the block. The utility function implements a family of boost factors
where each agent values goals 10 units of payoff more than each non goal state.
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Two features are worth observing. The first is that the utility function respects
the preference quasi-dichotomy of the agents: all outcomes that satisfy Ann’s (re-
spectively, Bob’s) goals are better in terms of utility than the outcomes that do
not. In the table, Ann’s highest utility is achieved at the state where the block is
lifted and the moved left, while for Bob, at all states where the block is lifted. The
second feature worth observing is that the shape this function takes is determined
by the family of boost factors instantiating the game. For each agent, a boost
factor works as a sort of psychological predisposition that weighs how important a
goal is with respect to all other states. Under this specific instance Ann and Bob
happen to construct the utility in a similar way, literally keeping a fixed distance
of 10 between the two, but many more variations are possible.
In the newly obtained game we can see, by dominance argument, there are
two payoff-equivalent pure strategy Nash equilibria, where Bob plays lN and Ann
either nL or nN — as Nash equilibria are all strategies where Bob plays lN and
Ann mixes between nL and nN — but in none of them the block is lifted, in spite
of Bob’s effort.
Representation result The following results establish a correspondence between
strategic games and strategic games with goals.
Proposition 1 (Strategic games with goals and strategic games)
s
1. Let G = ((N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), {Gi}i∈N ) be a strategic game with goals and ω a profile
of boost factors. There exists a strategic game S′ = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) such that, for
each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N , we have that uG(ω)i (σ) = pi′(σ).
2. Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game. Then there exists a strategic game
with goals G′ = (S′, {G}i) with S′ = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) such that, for all profiles of
boost factors ω, for each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N , uG′(ω)i (σ) = pi′(σ).
Proof For the first item, start out with a strategic game with goals
G = ((N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), {Gi}i∈N ), and a boost factor profile ω. Construct a strategic
S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) for which the payoff function is such that uG(ω)i (σ) = pi′(σ)
for each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N .
For the second item, consider the strategic game S, given by the tuple
(N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and construct the strategic game with goals G′ = (S′, {G}i) with
S′ = S and for each i ∈ N , set Gi = ∅. It follows that for all profiles of boost
factors ω we have that for each σ ∈∏i∈N Σi and each i ∈ N , uG(ω)i (σ) = pii(σ).
Thus, strategic games with goals and strategic games display a straightforward
correspondence and the proof of Proposition 1 provides an automatic procedure
to convert them into one another.
The reader might at this stage understandably be puzzled. We have introduced
strategic games with goals, and have called them a generalisation of strategic games,
showing that, in the end, the two structures are substantially equivalent. The rest
of the paper is devoted to showing that the introduction of dynamic operations,
such as the possibility of side-payments in a pre-play phase, brings to light sur-
prising differences between these structures.
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2.2 The case of Boolean Games
Boolean games, first introduced in (Harrenstein et al, 2001), are a simple model
of strategic interaction and technically a very special case of strategic games with
goals, where agents are endowed with goal formulas and can set the propositions
they control either to true or false, paying a cost for each action performed. We
describe them next and we motivate the need for our generalisation.
Definition 4 (Boolean Games) A boolean game is a tuple
(N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N )
where:
– N is a finite set of agents;
– Φ a finite set of propositional atoms; c : N × V → R+ is a cost function,
associating to each agent the cost he incurs in when some valuation v ∈ V of
the atoms Φ obtains;
– γi is a boolean formula, constructed on the set Φ, denoting the goal of agent i;
– Φi ⊆ Φ is the nonempty set of atoms controlled by agent i. As standard (van der
Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005), we assume that for j 6= i, Φi ∩ Φj = ∅ and that⋃{Φi | i ∈ N} = Φ, i.e., controlled atoms partition the whole space.
A choice of agent i is a function vi : Φi → {tt,ff}, representing agent i’s
decision to set the atoms he controls to either true or false . We denote Vi as
the set of possible choices of agent i. An outcome v ∈ ∏i∈N Vi of the boolean
game B is a collection of choices, one per agent. An outcome induces a valuation
function, assigning a boolean value to each propositional atom (van der Hoek
and Wooldridge, 2005). Therefore, we denote V =
∏
i∈N Vi the set of all possible
valuation functions and, for v ∈ V and ϕ being a boolean formula constructed on
Φ, we write v |= ϕ (resp. v 6|= ϕ) to say that ϕ holds (resp. does not hold) under
the valuation v.
The utility in boolean games is calculated using a boost factor µi, with µi =
maxv∈V (ci(v)), selecting the payoff of the worst outcome that can happen to agent
i, i.e., the updated valuation that is most costly to him, and adding it to the goal




 + µi − ci(v) if v |= γi−ci(v) otherwise
Figure 5 shows an example of this translation.
sC ¬sC
sR 3, 3 0, 5
¬sR 5, 0 1, 1
sC ¬sC
sR −3,−3 0,−5
¬sR −5, 6 5, 5
Fig. 5 From a boolean game to its induced strategic game. Each agent i is endowed with
boost factor µi.
When constructing a strategic game starting from a given boolean game we
soon realise the downside of the two main restrictions — otherwise extremely
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desirable from a computational point of view — differentiating boolean games
from the larger class of strategic game with goals:
– The number of strategies agents can play are always, 2n for some natural
number n, which can vary for each agent;
– The relative distance between goal states and non-goal states is given by the
µ+ 1 boost factor, which is fixed for each agent.
The first constraint is not particularly restrictive, but it shows an intuitive
difference between boolean games and strategic games with goals: while in boolean
games agents fully control propositional variables — i.e., they can always decide
whether to set them to true or false — strategic games with goals can be thought
of as a sort of boolean games with admissible valuation functions, and thereby
more general structures. The second constraint is somewhat more restrictive, as
the choice of the µ + 1 boost factor is extremely committal and bears a number
of consequences especially if we take utility to be transferable, as we do in our
framework. µ+1 is a regret-based (or even pride-based) boost factor: the worse non-
goal states are for an agent, the higher the payoff at his goal states; the factor
is independent of the actual numerical value assigned by the cost function, i.e.,
it does not vary along with the absolute values of its domain; what is more, it is
fixed for all agents, i.e., all agents apply exactly the same distance to separate goal
states and non-goal states.
These are among the reasons why we think that the more general approach
allowed by strategic games with goals is in order, which incorporates the important
features of the µ+ 1 class but leaves also space for more variety.
We would like however to point out that when dynamic operations, such as side-
payments or taxation mechanisms, are not allowed, boolean games are equivalent
to strategic games, and therefore to strategic games with goals, modulo positive
affine transformation.
Proposition 2 (Strategic games and boolean games)
s
1. Let B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) be a boolean game. Then there exist a strategic
game S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) and a bijective function f : V →
∏
i∈N Σi such that
for all i, uBi (v) = pii(f(v)).
2. Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game such that, for each i ∈ N there is n ∈
N\{0} with |Σi| = 2n . Then there exist a boolean game B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ),
a k ∈ N, and a bijective function f : V → ∏i∈N Σi such that for all i, uBi (v) =
pii(f(v))− k.
Proof For the first item, simply construct a strategic game such that f is a bijection
and then set each pii(f(v)) to return the value given by u
B
i (v). For the second one,
pick again f to be bijection, and, for a sufficiently large k ∈ N, set each γi to ⊥ —
i.e., p ∧ ¬p for some p ∈ Φi — and each uBi (v) to pii(f(v))− k.
Proposition 3 (Strategic games with goals and boolean games)
s
1. Let B = (N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ) be a boolean game. Then there exist a strate-
gic game with goals (S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), Gi) and a bijective function f : V →∏
i∈N Σi such that for all i, u
B
i (v) = ui(f(v)).
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2. Let (S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi), Gi) be a strategic game such that, for each i ∈ N
there is n ∈ N \ {0} with |Σi| = 2n . Then there exist a boolean game B =
(N,Φ, c, {γi}i∈N , {Φi}i∈N ), a k ∈ N, and a bijective function f : V →
∏
i∈N Σi
such that for all i, uBi (v) = ui(f(v))− k.
Proof Direct consequence of the definitions and the previous two results.
3 Endogenous games and quasi-dichotomous preferences
Endogenous games (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005) have been introduced as an exten-
sion of normal form games with a pre-play negotiation phase, where agents have
the possibility, before the game starts, to spend the amount of utility received at
certain outcomes to influence their opponents’ decision-making.
This section imports the ideas and the techniques of endogenous games to
games with quasi-dichotomous preferences and it shows that, in spite of the static
representation results of the previous section, the presence of goal states does make
a difference when side-payments are allowed.
Following (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005)7 we enrich a strategic game (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi)
with a family {Ti}i∈N where, for each agent i, Ti is a set of functions of the form
τi : Σ×N → R+. Each such function specifies how much payoff agent i secures the
other agents in case some particular outcome obtains. We call each τ ∈ ∏i∈N τi
a transfer function and a tuple (S, {Ti}i∈N ) an endogenous game. We more-
over denote τ0 the transfer function such that for all i, j ∈ N and σ ∈ Σ we have
τi(σ, j) = 0, which we call the void transfer function.
We require each set of transfer functions Ti to satisfy the following minimal
conditions:
If τ ′i is such that τ
′
i(ρ, j) = 0 for some j ∈ N, ρ ∈ Σ, then τ ′i ∈ Ti (3)
The property says that each agent is always able to offer nothing to any agent
at any outcome.
∀τ ′i ∈ Ti, ∀τ−i ∈
∏
j∈N\i
Tj , ∃τi ∈ Ti, ∀σ ∈ Σ,∀j ∈ N : τi(σ, j) = τj(σ, i) + τ ′i(σ, j) (4)
The property says that each agent is always able to give the money back once
received, possibly adding an available counteroffer.
7 While the approach to game transformation by side-payments adopted here (Jackson and
Wilkie, 2005) provides an elegant technical framework that well suits strategic games with
goals, we remind the reader of the existence of earlier related work in the game theory literature
(Guttman, 1978, 1987; Rosenthal, 1975; Kalai, 1981; Varian, 1994; Farrell, 1998). Pre-play
negotiations were originally conceived as a tool to overcome inefficiency introduced by the
non-cooperative structure of the interaction, without forcing the agents to form coalitions.
In particular, to regulate the effect of individuals’ actions on other individuals’ welfare, what
in economic theory is called externalities. There is abundant literature on these, e.g., Coase
(1960), (Meade, 1952), (Maskin, 1994), and a comprehensive account of models of pre-play
negotiations is to be found in (Goranko and Turrini, 2012), where a multi-step model of
pre-play negotiations in non-cooperative games, addressing some limitations of (Jackson and
Wilkie, 2005), is developed and which will briefly be described in Section 7.
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We argue that the conditions we impose on transfer functions are satisfied in
many cases, and represent a significant departure from the literature on pre-play
negotiations, where agents are endowed with the family {Ti}i∈N , incorporating all
transfer functions (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005; Guttman, 1978; Kalai, 1981; Farrell,
1998; Goranko and Turrini, 2012).
An endogenous game with goals is defined in the expected way, i.e., as a
tuple ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) where (S, {Gi}i∈N ) is a strategic game with goals
and (S, {Ti}i∈N ) is an endogenous game.
It is useful to think of an endogenous game (with goals) as a game consisting
of two phases:
– A pre-play phase, where agents simultaneously play a transfer function;
– An actual game play, where agents play a strategy and the payoff of the starting
game is updated taking the selected transfers into account.
Definition 5 (Update by side-payments)
Let S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game and let τ be a transfer function.
The play of τ in S is the strategic game τ(S) = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) where, for
σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ N ,







In a nutshell, when a game is updated by a transfer function each agent:
– adds to his payoff at each outcome all the transfers that he receives from the
other agents at that outcome;
– subtracts from his payoff at each outcome all the transfers he makes to the
other agents at that outcome.
Example 3 We have observed how our robots would act if they were to take their
decisions on what to do with the block independently and simultaneously with
no form of commitment, coordination or communication being allowed. In the
resulting situation, i.e., in all equilibria of the game, Bob would have his goal
satisfied, against a relatively high cost, while Ann would not, although not paying
any cost.
Let us now introduce a mechanism, which we will refer to as the energy channel,
connecting all agents involved in the interaction. The task of the energy channel
is to allow robots to share effort in the performance of their action. In particular,
a robot could end paying part of the cost of another robot as a function of the
outcome of the game. We can think of the energy channel as a mechanism acting
after the game has taken place: each robot will execute a task, employing a certain
amount of energy, which might get compensated through the energy channel. We
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the energy channel has no dispersion. The
way the channel can be used is as follows: before the interaction begins, each robot
involved can commit to bear an amount of effort (dually, offer an amount of payoff)
to some other robot, should a certain outcome be reached. For instance, Figure 6
shows how the starting strategic game with goals is updated by an offer by Ann
to Bob of 8 units of payoff at all outcomes where Bob tries and lift the block and,
once lifted, tries and move it left.






Fig. 6 An offer of 20 units of payoff by Ann to Bob for moving the block left. Strictly
dominated strategies nL and nN by Bob are disregarded.
It is worth noticing that the offer depicted is only a partial transfer profile, to
which Bob can respond with his own simultaneous counteroffer. But if we were
to read the offer as representing the only true updates of the matrix, considering
the rest void transfers, then we could notice that such a pre-play exchange would
fundamentally change the set of rational outcomes.8 In the novel game, there is
only one strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, moreover independent of the way
the game is instantiated: Bob plays lL and so does Ann. In the only equilibrium
outcome, both robots are satisfying their goal, Bob paying no cost, Ann paying 28.
This solution is clearly better for both than any Nash equilibrium of the original
game.
Let E = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) be an endogenous game with goals and let
E(ω) be its instantiation with the boost factor profile ω9. A pair (τ, σ), for τ
being a transfer function and σ a strategy profile available at S, is a sustainable
solution of E if there is a strategy in the two-phase game that is a subgame perfect
equilibrium and where (τ, σ) is played on the equilibrium path. In other words in
order for a pair (τ, σ) to be a sustainable solution of an endogenous game with
goals E = (S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) we require that there exists a strategy for
E(ω), i.e., a specification of a strategy profile σ′ for the actual game play after
every transfer function τ ′, such that:
1. (τ, σ) is a Nash Equilibrium in the two-phase game;
2. for every (τ ′, σ′) in the strategy specification, σ′ is a Nash-equilibrium in every
subgame τ ′(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) of the two-phase game.
Subgame perfect equilibria rule out incredible threats (Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994), in our case the fact that some transfers might be discouraged by the play
of strategies that are dominated after the transfers in question are made.
For a sustainable solution (τ, σ) of E = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N ) instantiated
with ω we say that σ is a surviving equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of
(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω).
3.1 Boost factors and game update
When a pre-play phase precedes a strategic game with goals instantiated with
a family of boost factors, we need to understand how the boost factors react to
8 As a result of the pre-play offer, some payoffs originally representing costs have now become
positive. We can think of this phenomenon as the robots being promised extra reserve battery
power in case a certain outcome is reached, which can be stored without actually being used.
9 The calculation of the utility after a transfer function has occurred is carried out as ex-
pected, i.e., in the updated strategic games with goals instantiated by ω.
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the game update. In particular, if boost factors are to encode a relative distance
between goal states and non-goal states, we do want these changes to be reflected
in the dynamics introduced by the possibility of side-payments.
To do so, we indicate ω(S,{Gi}i∈N ) the boost factor applied to game (S, {Gi}i∈N )
and omit the superscript when obvious. We indicate with Ω ↑ the set of all boost
factors satisfying the following property, under the assumption that pi is the payoff
function of S and piτ of τ(S):
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω
(τ(S),{Gi}i∈N )
i (x)⇔ ∃σ 6∈ Gi such that ∀σ′ 6∈ Gi, pii(σ) ≥ piτi (σ′)
(5)
What the definition says is that, fixing a boost factor, the utility of goal states is
pushed upwards the higher the payoff non-goal states yield. It is pushed downwards
otherwise.
We will also consider a different type of boost factor, modelling agents that
value more goal states the further away they are from the worst possible outcome
they could end up in. It is the regret-based boost factor that generalises the µ factor
typical of boolean games (Wooldridge et al, 2013). We indicate with Ω ↓ the set
of all boost factor profiles satisfying the following property:
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω
(τ(S),{Gi}i∈N )
i (x)⇔ ∃σ 6∈ Gi such that ∀σ′ 6∈ Gi, pii(σ) ≤ piτi (σ′)
(6)
What the definition says is that, fixing a boost factor, the utility of goal states is
pushed upwards the lower the payoff non-goal states yield. It is pushed downwards
otherwise.
As we will see later, having a boost factor profile in the set Ω ↓ makes a
huge difference in agents’ strategic behaviour, as agents can deliberately strive to
increase their cost at non-goal states for the sole reason of increasing their payoff
at goal states.
Unless otherwise specified we consider boost factor profiles in the set Ω ↑.
Example 4 Let us go back again to our working example and assume that the game
is instantiated by a boost factor profile ω in the set Ω ↑, working as specified by
the constraints we have imposed. Also assume that the space of transfers is T . The
original Nash equilibria of the game (lN, nL) and (lN, nN), and any mixing thereof,
are not surviving, as no matter what transfer we use to sustain them, Ann will
always be in a position to make (lL, lL) a unique dominant strategy equilibrium,
by means of a transfer compensating Bob while still making her better off. It
is also not difficult to see that the profile of offers illustrated in the previous
example, where Ann is paying 20 to Bob to make him try and move the block left
is not sustainable. Ann could have obtained the same result by offering Bob just
enough, i.e., 10 plus an arbitrarily small amount , to make his strategy lL uniquely
dominant. But even that would not be enough! In fact, by the same reasoning,
Ann could have offered 10 + 2 and get the job done. As we could go on forever,
there is no least amount Ann could offer on top of 10, so, in the end won’t be able
to turn lL into a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, guaranteeing its stability.
However the profile (lL, lL) of the original game is sustainable, as Figure 7 shows.
No matter how the game is instantiated — as long as we fix a boost factor
profile ω in the set Ω ↑ — Ann will have no incentive to deviate for this profile
of offers. If she did it, and they ended up not playing lL, she would certainly not






Fig. 7 A sustainable solution. Ann offers Bob 10 for moving the block left and both set of
play lL in the continuation.
be better off. But neither would she, if they ended up playing lL anyway. For Bob
the reasoning is similar.
At this point the reader may have wonder what the difference actually is be-
tween strategic games with goals and strategic games, and what the need therefore
would be to study endogenous games with goals as separate structures. After all,
we have shown a rather straightforward correspondence between the two (Propo-
sition 1).
The following proposition is a hint of the fact that the similarity between
them is not as obvious as the previous results might suggest. Concretely, when
introduce dynamic operations that update the game (such as side-payments), the
correspondence ceases to exist.
Proposition 4 (Dynamic asymmetry)
Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) be a strategic game with goals, ω a boost
factor profile, τ0, τ ′ be two transfer functions, S0,S′ the strategic games corresponding
to τ0(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) and τ ′(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω), respectively. It is not necessarily the
case that τ ′(S0) = S′.
Proof Consider the strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N ), such that
S = ({A,B}, {Σi}i∈N , pi), GB = ∅, GA = {σ∗A, σ∗B}, pii(σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N,σ ∈
Σ and |ΣA| = |ΣB | = 2. Consider the transfer functions τ0 and τ ′ such that
τ ′A(σ,B) = 2, for all σ 6∈ GA while τ ′A(σ∗, B) = 0 and τ ′B(σ,A) = 0 for all











A (−2) > −2 and that ω
(τ ′(S),{G}i)(ω)
A (−2) <
0 . σ∗ yields agent A a payoff x ≥ 0 in τ ′(S0) but not in S′.
The proposition shows that updating a strategic game with goals and its corre-
sponding strategic game with the same transfer profile does not necessarily main-
tain the correspondence between the two structures.
The reason lies on the fact that the utility function is calculated in such a
way that a agent gets a boosted payoff in outcomes satisfying his goal, but always
relative to the value yielded by the non-goal states. The results in the next section
will show that this imbalance bears heavy consequences in terms of equilibrium
analysis.
4 Equilibria in the two-phase game
This section is devoted to the exploration of the formal properties of rational
outcomes in endogenous games with goals. In particular, of how the properties
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of equilibria in those structures are related to the ones already known in the
literature.
The classical results on equilibrium survival for the case of endogenous games
(Jackson and Wilkie, 2005) are centred on the notion of solo payoff, i.e., the payoff
that a single agent i can guarantee if the opponents −i do not make any transfer.
Definition 6 (Solo payoff)
Let E(ω) = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) be an endogenous game with goals in-
stantiated by a boost factor profile ω. The solo payoff sˆi for agent i, where sup is






In words, the solo payoff of agent i is given by the best transfer i can make,
under the expectation that:
– his opponents will not make any transfer
– will play the worst for i Nash equilibrium in each subgame.
When the underlying game is fixed and no confusion can arise, we use the
notation sˆi. Outcomes at which agent i is receiving at least sˆi can be considered
desirable from i’s perspective: he could not improve his final payoff even if he was
the only one allowed to make monetary offers.
Two important facts are known for endogenous games (Jackson and Wilkie,
2005):
1. when N ≤ 2, a Nash equilibrium survives if and only if each agent gets at least
his solo payoff;
2. when N > 2, every pure strategy Nash equilibrium survives.
As common with models of pre-play negotiations, and bargaining in general,
there is a fundamental distinction between situations in which two or more agents
are involved. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that, in the two agent case, each
agent that receives an offer is always able to counter it with an offer that leads
the game to the status quo, i.e., each agent can always give the money back.
With three agents it is not possible for a agent to unilaterally restore the money
transfers.
The first result carries over to endogenous games with goals. The argument we
use is similar to the one by (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005), but our result holds for a
broader class of transfer functions.
Proposition 5 E(ω) = ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) be an endogenous game with goals
instantiated by a boost factor profile ω and such that the each Ti satisfies conditions 3
and 4. A Nash equilibrium strategy profile ρ is surviving if and only if ui(ρ) ≥ sˆE(ω)i
Proof From right to left, consider a Nash equilibrium strategy profile ρ such that
ui(ρ) ≥ sˆE(ω)i . To see that it is surviving, construct a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the two phase game such that (τ0, ρ) is played on the equilibrium path. This
is possible by the fact that each Ti satisfies condition 3. Off the equilibrium path
instead, if some agent offers transfers in the first period, then identify the worst
equilibrium for that agent in the resulting second-stage game and have that be
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played in the continuation. Play any Nash equilibrium instead if more than one
agent deviates from τ0. This is an equilibrium, as no agent can improve upon
(τ0, ρ). From left to right, instead, suppose that ui(ρ) < sˆ
E(ω)
i for some surviving
Nash equilibrium ρ. But this means that there exists a transfer function τ such
that all Nash equilibria x of (τi, τ
0−i)((S, {Gi}i∈N )) are such that ui(x) > ui(ρ).
Consider now any transfer function τ∗ such that (τ∗, ρ) is a surviving equilib-
rium. By condition 4, agent i can switch to a profile of transfers τ ′i such that
∀σ ∈ Σ :∑j∈N\i τ ′i(σ, j) =∑j∈N\i τ∗j (σ, i) +∑j∈N\i τi(σ, j). We can observe that
(τ ′iτ
∗
−i)(S, {Gi}i∈N ) = τ(S, {Gi}i∈N ), which shows that τi is a profitable deviation.
One might expect that, due to the correspondence between strategic games
and strategic games with goals, also the result for N > 2 would carry over. It
might come as a surprise that, in fact, it does not.
Proposition 6 There exists an endogenous game with goals E(ω) with more than 2
agents and Nash equilibrium outcome σ of E(ω) that is not a surviving equilibrium.
Proof Consider the strategic game with goals (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) where S is given
by the tuple ({A,B,C}, {Σi}i∈{A.B,C}, pi), and where GB = GC = ∅, GA =
{σ∗A, σ∗B , σ∗C}, pii(σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N,σ ∈ Σ. Suppose moreover that, for M =
maxi∈N,σ,σ′∈Σ{pii(σ) − pii(σ′)} be the highest payoff difference a agent can in-
cur in the game, agents’ A’s transfers functions are such ∀τ−A, ∃τA ∈ TA, ∀σ ∈
Σ,∀j, k ∈ −A : τA(σ, j) =
∑
k∈−A τk(σ, j)+M . In other words, agent A has enough
resources to be able to compensate all other agents for the result of every nego-






C 6= σ∗C is a Nash equilibrium. However




C)) to be the
strategy played on the equilibrium path. Now for each payoff that agent C is get-














C)−piτC(σ∗A, σ∗B , σ∗C), making it worthwhile for C to satisfy
A’s goal. Such deviation exists by the properties of TA.
The idea of the proof is quite simple: when goal realization is at stake and
a agent has enough resources, she could go to any length to have it satisfied. So
Nash equilibria of the initial game will not survive if a joint deviation of a group
of agents satisfies the goal of some other resourceful agent without compromising
their own. Figure 8 illustrates one more such scenario.
L R
U 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
D 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
1
L R
U 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
D 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
2
Fig. 8 A three agent game, with the third agent choosing the matrix to be played. Row wants
(U,L, 1) to be realised and, no matter what the distribution of payoffs after the pre-play phase
looks like, he is willing to compensate the other agents to go along that strategy. Notice that
Row’s deviation in the pre-play phase is effective, as it does not compromise the opponents’
goals. The Nash equilibrium outcome (D,R, 2) is not surviving.
Proposition 6 is of fundamental importance, not only because it shows that
there is a strategic game with goals with |N | > 2 where a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium is not surviving, at odds with well-known results for the strategic games
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case, but because Proposition 1 was suggesting a straightforward correspondence
between strategic games and strategic games with goals. The reason of this imbal-
ance was already hinted at by Proposition 4, which showed how the application of
the same transfer function to a strategic game and to its corresponding strategic
game with goals was not guaranteed to yield corresponding structures. Proposition
6 uses the same idea to show that dynamic factors such as transfer functions are
enough to falsify fundamental results for the otherwise statically correspondent
strategic games 10.
Example 5 Consider again the Nash equilibria of our two-agent starting scenario:
(lN, nL) and (lN, nN), and any mixing thereof. We showed previously how none
of them was a surviving equilibrium, constructing a deviation for every possible
transfer profile imposed on the starting game. Proposition 5 shows that we could
simply check that the payoff-equivalent (lN, nL) and (lN, nN) are not yielding Ann
her solo payoff. This is readily done, as fixing Bob’s transfer to be void, there exist
a transfer function, i.e., the one offering Bob 10 +  for playing lL, guaranteeing
Ann a positive payoff, even if Bob played the worst for Ann’s Nash equilibrium.
This, once again, is independent of how the game is instantiated.
Suppose we added now a third agent, Charles, with no goals and two actions,
A and B, choosing between two copies of the original game, and constant payoff
at every state (see Figure 9). The presence of Charles would not affect the sus-
tainability of the solution in either of the two games. No matter what the transfer
profile is that they play, Ann would always be able to turn the tables and offer
the agents enough compensation for making them worth while to play the desired
profile. The original Nash equilibria are therefore not surviving, even with three
agents. Notice, once again, that this relies on the space of offers being Ti11.
lL lN
lL −8,−20, 0 −8,−10, 0
lN −5,−20, 0 −5,−10, 0
nL +0,−20, 0 +0,−10, 0
nN +0,−20, 0 +0,−10, 0
A
lL lN
lL −8,−20, 0 −8,−10, 0
lN −5,−20, 0 −5,−10, 0
nL +0,−20, 0 +0,−10, 0
nN +0,−20, 0 +0,−10, 0
B
Fig. 9 Ann, Bob and Charles.
In spite of the negative result discussed above, we are still able to show a suffi-
cient condition for all pure strategy Nash equilibria to survive in certain strategic
games with goals, independently of the number of agents involved.
Proposition 7 (Survival)
Let (S, {Gi}i∈N ) be strategic game with goals and let it be instantiated by a boost
factor profile ω. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium σ of S survives whenever ui(σ) ≥ sˆi
for each i ∈ N .
10 In the terminology of (Harrenstein et al, 2014) such outcomes would be called soft equi-
libria, meaning that they can be rationally removed by the appropriate use of allowed game
transformations.
11 In fact, a weaker requirement is sufficient, i.e., that for every τ sustaining an original Nash
equilibrium of the game, Ann had enough resources to construct a profitable deviation.
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Proof We need to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-phase game
where σ is played. On the equilibrium path let agents play the profile (τ0, σ).
Off the equilibrium path, if a single agent deviates from τ0 pick the worst Nash
equilibrium for that agent and have that played in the continuation. If more than a
agent deviates from τ0, play any Nash equilibrium. We can observe that no agent
i can get more than sˆi by deviating from τ
0, given the choices played in each
subgame. Moreover σ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of S.
What we have shown is that when a Nash equilibrium σ gives the agents at
least their solo payoff then that Nash equilibrium survives. In fact the proof of
the proposition shows even more, i.e., that the agents will actually obtain at least
their solo payoff in that equilibrium.
The case of regret-based boost factors For families of strategic games with goals
instantiated by boost factors in Ω ↓ the results are even more striking.
Proposition 8 (No survival)
There exist (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) with |N | = 3, ω ∈ Ω ↓ and {σ∗} = NE(τ0((S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω)))
such that:
– σ′ ∈ ⋂i∈N Gi if and only if σ′i = σ∗i
– σ∗ is not a surviving equilibrium.
Proof Let G(ω) with G = ((N,Σ, pi), {Gi}i∈N ) be such that N = {1, 2, 3} and for
each i ∈ N we have that Σi = {σi, ρi} and Gi = {σ′ | σ′i = σi}. The payoff
function is such that pi1(ρ) = −10, for and pi1(σ′) = 0 for σ′ 6= ρ, with pi1(σ′) =
pi2(σ
′) = pi3(σ′) for each σ′ ∈ Σ. The outcome σ is clearly a dominant strategy
equilibrium. Suppose now that it is also a surviving equilibrium and that the
transfer function τ is part of the solution. But then there exists some agent i for
which u
τ(G)(ω)
i (σ) ≤ u
τ(G)(ω)
j (σ) for some j 6= i. This means, by the properties of







j∈N τi(ρ), j) while τ
′
i(σ
′, j) = τi(σ′, j) for each σ 6= ρ.
No matter what equilibrium will be played in the resulting subgame, i will be
increasing is payoff in σ. Contradiction.
So not only have we constructed a non-surviving pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium in the case of more than two agents, but also an outcome that is shared joint
goal among all agents and even dominant strategy profile in every continuation,
which is a straightforward truth for boost factor profiles ω ∈ Ω ↑. As anticipated,
with boost factor profiles in Ω ↓ agents can increase their cost at non-goal states
for the sole reason of increasing their payoff at goal states, which is exactly what
happens here. Figure 10 displays once more this fact.
What we have shown tells us, once again, how having boost factors where the
payoff at goal states is increased by decreasing the payoff at non goal states, as done
for instance with boolean games in (Wooldridge et al, 2013; Turrini, 2013), has
unwanted consequences. In (Turrini, 2013) for instance, sufficient conditions for
survival of pure strategy Nash equilibria in boolean games with costs (Wooldridge
et al, 2013) are shown to be extremely demanding and require, besides the standard
condition on solo-payoffs, also an upper bound on the payoff agents can receive as




U 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
D 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1
L R
U 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
D 0, 0, 0 −10,−10,−10
2
Fig. 10 A three agent game, with the third agent (Table) choosing the matrix to be played.
Row wants any outcome consistent with U to be realised, Column any outcome consistent with
L and Table any outcome consistent with 1. Notice that all agents are in control of their own
goal satisfaction. To ease readability we avoid displaying all coalitional colours which are, as
expected, {Row,Column}, {Table, Column}, {Row,Column, Table}, {Row, Table}. Rather,
we only label the strategies corresponding to individual agents’ goals. The maroon outcome
(U,L, 1) is Row’s, Column’s and Table’s joint goal and happens to be a dominant strategy
equilibrium of the game. However it is not a surviving equilibrium as, no matter what the
distribution of payoffs after the pre-play phase looks like, there will always be a agent that
can increase his cost at outcome (D,R, 2) for the sole reason to increase his payoff at outcome
(U,L, 1).
5 An integrated framework for resource-bounded agents
In this section we integrate the possibility for agents to exchange side-payments
with the possibility for an external authority to impose taxes. Taxes, we will see,
can effectively be used to overcome the limitations in resources agents have during
the pre-play phase. We also explore further the relation between centralised and
decentralised mechanisms.
Consider a strategic game with goals (S), {Gi}i∈N )(ω). We say that an out-
come σ is potentially-dominant if it is a dominant strategy equilibrium of some
(τ(S), {Gi}i∈N )(ω) for τ ∈
∏
i∈N Ti. The space of potentially dominant outcomes
is quite large. In a strategic game, for instance, every outcome is potentially domi-
nant. Also, the desirable solution of our starting example, where Ann can convince
Bob to move the block left, is potentially dominant. Intuitively, potentially domi-
nant outcomes are conflict-free, i.e., ideally agents could ensure their achievement
in equilibrium. As such, an external authority might want some of these outcomes
to be attainable rational outcomes of a negotiation. However, it might be the case
that agents do not have enough resources to sustain them, i.e., their family of
transfer functions is much more restricted than T , or agents might have no way of
constructing a surviving equilibrium given the initial payoffs. The purpose of this
section is to study taxation mechanisms that guarantee these type of outcomes to
be turned into surviving equilibria.
Wooldridge et al. (Wooldridge et al, 2013) define taxation mechanisms on a
boolean game as functions associating to every agent a monetary sanction at each
particular outcome. We employ this notion for the more general framework of
strategic games with goals, defining them as functions αi : Σ → R+, subtracting
the taxes received from a agent at a certain outcome to his payoff.
To ease the connection with our previous definitions we introduce the strategic
game α(S), i.e., the game S to which the taxation mechanism α = ∏i∈N αi is
applied, as the strategic game (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) where for each i ∈ N,σ ∈ Σ we
have that pi′i(σ) = pii(v) − αi(σ). The way taxes modify goals’ value is similar to
what happens for the case of transfer functions:
ω
(S,{Gi}i∈N )
i (x) ≥ ω
(α(S),{Gi}i∈N )
i (x)⇔ ∃σ 6∈ Gi such that ∀σ′ 6∈ Gi, pii(σ) ≥ pi′i(σ′)
(7)
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Transfer functions and taxation mechanisms are of a rather different kind.
While the former ones consist of payoff redistributions among agents at certain
outcomes, without adding or subtracting to the agents’ total payoff, the latter ones
explicitly inject new sanctions into the system to modify agents’ decision-making.
However, in a technical sense, we can always find a taxation mechanism having
the same effect of a transfer function on an underlying game.
Proposition 9 (From side-payments to taxes)
Let (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi′) be a strategic game and τ a transfer function. There exists a
taxation mechanism α such that NE(τ(S)) = NE(α(S)).
Proof Straightforward.
Proposition 9 shows that, in some respect, taxation mechanisms can simulate
transfer functions. It must however be said that simulations of this kind only
make sense when both taxation mechanisms and transfers functions are fixed. But
unlike taxation mechanisms, that are decided externally, transfer functions bear
further strategic considerations. As made clear in the motivating example, it is
not enough to establish that a transfer function induces equilibria in the resulting
game, but we also need to establish whether the transfer function itself is part of a
larger equilibrium, i.e., whether agents are not better off by switching to different
transfers.
The procedure we present shows how to use taxation mechanisms to make
potentially dominant outcomes survive. It takes an outcome of the original game
that is potentially dominant and yields a taxation mechanism that turns it into a
surviving Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 steps
Input An outcome σ of (S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi) that is potentially
dominant.
Output A taxation mechanism α on S.
Steps ciao
1. Let αi(σ
′) = 0, for each i ∈ N,σ′ ∈ Σ;
2. While u
(α(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)




′) := αi(σ′) + 1, for each σ′ 6= σ ∈ Σ;
3. Return α.
Proposition 10 (Survival by taxation)
Let σ be a potentially dominant outcome of an instantiated strategic game with goals
(S, {Gi}i∈N )(ω) with S = (N, {Σi}i∈N , pi). There exists a taxation mechanism α such
that σ is a surviving equilibrium of
((α(S), {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω).
Proof To see that Algorithm 1 guarantees this fact we only need to observe that the
construction of α at step 1 and step 2 ensures that the payoff u
(α(S),{Gi}i∈N )(ω)
i (σ)
will eventually reach sˆ
((α(S),{Gi}i∈N ),{Ti}i∈N )(ω)
i as σ is potentially dominant.
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External authorities as agents One of the reasons why it is important to study
decentralised solutions is the fact that centralised solutions are generally more
costly and not always available. Our previous results suggest that this can be a
fundamental problem in terms of attainment of desirable properties: we might
want a potentially dominant outcome to be surviving but we find out that it will
not be surviving unless some taxation mechanism is introduced. The question we
ask here is whether endogenous mechanisms are inherently weak, i.e., whether
there is no way of making some outcome that can survive thanks to an external
authority also survive in some minimal modification of the original endogenous
game, minimal in the sense that agents’ transfer powers and objectives remain
the same. What we show is that decentralised mechanisms are powerful enough
to encode centralised mechanisms. The idea is simple: we expand an endogenous
games with goals ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) with one distinguished agent i∗ such
as:
1. Σi∗ = {σi∗}, i.e., the distinguished agent only has a single action at its disposal;
2. Ti∗ = Ti∗ , i.e., the distinguished agent can offer unbounded incentives to all
agents at all outcomes 12;
3. For each agent i 6= i∗, transfer function τi ∈ Ti and outcome σ we have that
τi(σ, i
∗) = 0, i.e., the distinguished agent cannot receive incentives.
4. the rest remains as in ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω). 13
For an endogenous game with goals ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) we call
((S, {Gi}i∈N )), {Ti}i∈N )∗(ω) an internalised expansion if it is obtained by aug-
menting ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) with a agent i∗ satisfying the properties above.
We can now show the following:
Proposition 11 Let ((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) be an endogenous game with goals
and ((S, {Gi}i∈N )), {Ti}i∈N )∗(ω) be an internalised expansion. Then, for each po-
tentially dominant profile σ with {(σ, σi∗)} = Gi∗ and for some taxation mechanism
α:
σ is surviving equilibrium of ((α(S), {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω) if and only if (σ, σi∗)
is a surviving equilibrium of ((S, {Gi}i∈N )), {Ti}i∈N )∗(ω).
Proof From right to left. Pick a transfer profile τ∗ making (σ, σi∗) a surviving equi-
librium in ((S, {Gi}i∈N )), {Ti}i∈N )∗(ω), which exists by the assumptions. Now
replicate the transfers of all agents j 6= i∗ and construct α such that αi(σ) =
−τ∗i∗(σ, σi∗ , i). From left to right, engineer the minimal τ∗i that makes (σ, σi∗)
unique dominant strategy equilibrium. This is possible because {(σ, σi∗)} = Gi∗
and because σ is potentially dominant. Then add incentives at each outcome and
player, until it the equilibrium becomes surviving, iterating as in Algorithm 1.
Notice that the taxation mechanism α in the proposition need not be min-
imal, in particular it need not be the one returned by Algorithm 1 on input
((S, {Gi}i∈N ), {Ti}i∈N )(ω).
12 This assumption is just for technical convenience. In fact, as Algorithm 1 shows, we need
a finite amount of monetary injection on a system to make a potentially dominant outcome
be surviving.
13 As σi∗ is the only action available to player i∗, there is a natural bijection with the starting
set of strategy profiles, remaining players, goals and payoff functions.
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6 Related Work
The multi-agent systems community has produced a number of models and results
that are related to our contribution and the topic of distributed solution of multi-
agent decision problems is one of its core concerns. As an example, the recently
concluded COST action Agreement Technologies 14 has emphasised the need of
having ”computer systems in which autonomous software agents negotiate with
one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable
agreements”.
Our conviction is that the endogenous games approach, combined with a proper
goal-oriented modelling of agent interaction, 15 is able to provide a platform for
analysis for these computer systems. In particular we stress how it provides a
decentralised, non-cooperative and goal-oriented approach to multi-agent interaction.
Especially in the past decade, there has been a tremendous focus on computa-
tional analysis of distributed processes, in the context of the related research lines
of automated negotiation, incentive engineering and coalition formation, thanks to
the growth of algorithmic game theory as unifying tool for analysing distributed
processes. We discuss these related reseach lines, emphasising the added value of
our framework with respect to the focus and the assumptions they build upon.
6.1 Negotiation
Several contributions exist in the field of artificial intelligence that have studied ne-
gotiation among rational agents. This has mostly boiled down to the analysis of the
algorithmic properties of allocation procedures studied in game theory and social
choice (comprehensive surveys of negotiation in multi-agent systems are (Kraus,
2001) and (Rosenschein, 1994)). Very few articles have dealt with the problem
of escaping inefficiency of strategic interaction by agents striking deals. Among
them the seminal contribution by Rosenschein and Genesereth (Rosenschein and
Genesereth, 1985) in which, possibly for the first time, game-theoretic models of
contracts are studied to resolve conflict in agent societies. In their framework each
agent is basically a agent in a normal form game but he is given the possibility to
specify a set of joint moves, i.e., strategy profiles, that he is willing to accept as
outcomes. If the intersection of all agents’ suggestions is nonempty, then a profile
inside that set is chosen by a fair arbiter and executed. Moreover, a payoff func-
tion, conditional on each agent move and suggested outcomes, is used to study
equilibrium outcomes. While the notion of deal in (Rosenschein and Genesereth,
1985) does have some intuitive connections with sustainable outcomes, there are
a number of substantial differences:
– We have added goal-states to a starting normal form game, capturing agents
goal-directedness (Castelfranchi, 1998) as different from maximal payoff, work-
ing on a more general, quasi-dichotomous, preference relation.
14 http://www.agreement-technologies.eu
15 We note on the fly that the tradition of modelling goal states in the multi-agent systems
community is divided between a purely qualitative logic-based account of goals (e.g., the
BDI logic-based tradition) and the game-theoretic approach, that treats goals as synonym of
maximal payoff states under a classical utility function. To the best of our knowledge, the first
approach combining the two is Boolean Games with costs.
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– We have kept the interaction inherently strategic. Agents are not allowed to
coordinate on joint offers, nor to propose their play, but to provide monetary
incentives to their fellow agents, in order to modify their decision-making. In
the tradition of pre-play negotiations, the starting normal form game, even
when updated by transfers, remains non-cooperative.
– We have explicitly studied a pre-play negotiation phase, where offers affect the
game to be played, before the game starts. Rational outcomes of the pre-play
negotiations have been studied as subgame perfect equilibria of the two phase
game.
In general, the models of negotiations studied in the multi-agent systems com-
munity emphasise the distributed and non-cooperative nature of the decision-
making process, which are also building blocks of our approach. There are also
approaches to the regulation of a multi-agent system that are somewhat related to
ours, involving either centralised solutions - an external authority that can effec-
tively transform the interaction of the decision-makers - or cooperative solutions -
where individuals are allowed to join forces and coordinate towards the realisation
of collective improvement, e.g., utility maximisation. Both approaches have roots
in game theory and have been taken up in the multi-agent systems literature which
has further analysed their computational properties.
6.2 Centralised solutions
While our approach to the use side-payments as a decentralised negotiation mech-
anism has ancient roots in the game-theoretic tradition (e.g., (Coase, 1960; Meade,
1952; Maskin, 1994)), there has been work in the social choice literature that has
used side payments to model incentive engineering, in particular to model bribery.
In this area, at least from the paper on lobbying and legislative bargaining by Help-
man and Persson (Helpman and Perrson, 1998), bribery has been modelled as a
centralised single-agent decision problem, where an external authority attempts
to influence the behaviour of a group of decision-makers, e.g., a committee, by
offering monetary incentive. This approach is taken up in a variety of computa-
tional studies of bribery and lobbying in the multi-agent systems community, e.g.,
(Faliszewski et al, 2009) in which an external agent tries to ensure a victory of one
of the candidates via bribing some voters to change their votes. Other, more dis-
tant, forms of centralised solutions studied in game theory are the principal-agent
problem (Grossman and Hart, 1983) and the theory of coalitional incentives in
(Winter, 2010), which aim at answering questions of the kind ”how much should
a single agent or a group of agents be paid to sustain a certain effort?”
Unlike those approaches, ours is inherently decentralised and multi-agent: ev-
ery participant in the interaction can be allowed to offer incentive to every other
participant, in order to reach a more satisfactory outcome. Our belief is that
modelling bribery as merely centralised decision problem, in particular without
allowing counteroffers from the bribed parties, is often an unwanted oversimplifi-
cation which our proposal allows to overcome. We point moreover out that this
is independent on whether offers happen in normal form games or voting games,
where the outcome is determined by a voting rule. Clearly the bribing strategies
will be different, e.g., to pass a legislation there might be need to bribe the ma-
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jority of agents, but this does not change the need of a decentralised multi-agent
pre-play (respectively, pre-vote) phase.
Other centralised approaches have been studied in the multi-agent systems
community, involving utility transfer, possibly the most notable one being the
idea of mediator by Monderer and Tennenholtz (Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2006),
which study models of external agents (the mediators) that can modify the payoff
redistribution from outside - rather than endogenously - and can achieve more
efficient outcomes in non-cooperative game.
6.3 Cooperative solutions
Our approach is inherently non-cooperative. Even though agents are allowed to
offer incentives to modify the decision-making of their fellow agents, they always
do this at their cost and they always rationally choose to transfer monetary payoff
if this is increasing their individual expected utility in the resulting game. In
all equilibria they also transfer the minimal amount of money needed to convince
other agents to change their decision. In this sense, with a pre-play phase agents are
allowed to ”bargain” over the outcome to be played (a relation between extensive
form pre-play negotiations and Rubinstein’s bargaining games (Rubinstein, 1982)
is formally shown in (Goranko and Turrini, 2012)) but they are not allowed to
play as a coalition. If agents were allowed to play as a coalition and pick the
best possible outcomes for themselves, then the game would clearly trivialise. The
fact that agents are keeping their individual perspective and looking at their own
expected utility, allows us to treat transfers as strategies of a larger game.
An important game-theoretic approach to the study of coalitions acting on a
starting non-cooperative game is Aumann’s model of strong equilibria, (Aumann,
1959), which can be seen as the cooperative solution concept of the core applied to a
non-cooperative game (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). The theory of cooperative
game has also analysed redistributions of payoff in coalitional games, i.e., the
so-called TU games (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). We point out once more
how these approaches do not preserve the bargaining nature typical of pre-play
negotiations.
An interesting yet only remotely related example of use of cooperative ap-
proaches for manipulating elections is (Zuckerman et al, 2011). As the authors
speficy, the term (coalitional) manipulation is referred to ”a situation where a
voter (a group of voters) casts votes not according to his (their) true preferences,
but rather to ob- tain some goal”. Despite the differences this suggests an inter-
esting application for models of goal-directed agency.
7 Discussion
The framework we have developed here could be extended in many ways, to cover
more structured types of interaction. In what follows we elaborate on several ab-
stractions that our framework implicitly contains and on ways to overcome them.
On the structure of goal states In a strategic game with goals, a goal state is mod-
elled as a strategy profile, a combination of actions for each agent that results in
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an outcome of the game. When choosing between two outcomes, an agent will first
check whether the outcomes satisfy her goal, and only after she will consider the
associated payoff. The cognitive theory of goals is rather complex (see for instance
the number of differences in goal modes made in (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995))
and our modelling choices abstract away from many of its features. The first that
comes to mind is the difference between terminal goals, i.e., states that are desired
fixed objectives, and non-terminal goals, i.e, states that are instrumental to the
realization of the other goals. It seems to us that working on extensive form struc-
tures could be a first step to make the difference explicit between these two types
of goals. Our models already contain these type of structures — as well known
extensive game can be canonically translated into normal form games (Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994) — however the extensive form representation can facilitate
means-end reasoning. If terminal goals can be seen as static objectives an agent
wants to achieve, certainly non-terminal goals have a clear dynamic. If an agent
realises to have a device at his disposal to realise his objective to lift a block, we
would certainly want the agent to go on and want to use the device to lift the
block. This type of goal dynamics can effectively be captured in extensive games
with imperfect knowledge, where the means-end relations can be learned.
On the structure of the negotiation phase The model of pre-play negotiation adopted
here is a more general version of the one in (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005), where
agents simultaneously exchange binding offers in case a certain outcome is achieved.
One could employ a more refined binary structure to model negotiations, as the
one developed (Goranko and Turrini, 2013, 2012), where agents alternate offers
and counteroffers on a starting normal form game and only stop if agents are
happy with the updated game. More in details, starting from a normal form game
G, there is a turn function t determining how agents take turns. Each agent to
move can either pass or make a binding offer of payoff to the opponents, on top
of the ones already made thus far. 16. If all agents pass, the game terminates.
This has been shown to yield a proper bargaining game, of the type analysed in
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994), where agents bargaining on what game they will
end up playing. It is known that, when in bargaining games with valuable time,
i.e., when they agents’ payoff is discounted taking into account the length of the
negotiation, agent quickly settle for fair and efficient divisions of payoff.
Each of these features can be desirable when modelling a particular type of
application, and for each of them the effect can be observed on the properties of
surviving equilibria.
Pre-play negotiations and agent dependencies Pre-play negotiations are a mechanism
to solve non-cooperative interaction, giving agents the possibility to sacrifice a part
of the payoff received at a certain outcome to convince their fellow agents to change
their strategy. Intuitively this is possible only if agents making the offer:
– are interested in having some other agents changing their decision-making;
16 In Goranko and Turrini’s model (Goranko and Turrini, 2012), the offers can be made on the
strategies played by opponents (unconditional offers) or conditional on matching counteroffers
(conditional offers). Without entering technical details, it is sufficient to know that both type
of offers can be (at least statically) simulated by the transfer functions studied here.
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– they can sacrifice enough payoff to persuade their fellow agents and still make
the resulting outcome worthwhile for everyone involved in the exchange.
Intuitively, only when agents are not indifferent to the way their opponents
play, offers make sense. This is the sort of dependence relation first described in
(Castelfranchi et al, 1992), incorporated by (Bonzon et al, 2009a) in the analysis
of boolean games with binary preference17 and by (Grossi and Turrini, 2012)
in the analysis of strategic games. The solutions to the games given both in
(Bonzon et al, 2009a) and (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) allow agents to literally ex-
change favours, modelling no quantitative bargain and seeing agents as potentially
resource-unbounded. The framework we present here allows for a more fine-grained
resolution of a strategic games with goals, but what the properties are of the de-
pendence relations that actually determine the outcome a negotiation is still not
understood.
Voting games The framework developed here can have interesting applications in
domains where actors are engaged in a collective decision. If we think of each
actor wanting to achieve a certain set of outcomes of a collective decision that
is determined by a given voting rule, then it is interesting to study how pre-vote
negotiations can effectively affect the outcome of a collective decision, providing
as well a novel model to study bribing in elections (Faliszewski et al, 2009). Voting
rules can easily be implemented in a boolean game by making a certain variable
true at an outcome if and only if it is selected by that rule. For instance, under
the majority rule, a proposition p will hold at outcome σ if and only if there is a
group C that is at least as large as the majority such that every member i of C
has set a proposition pi true at σ. Resources (payoff) can be assigned to agents
as a function of the outcome of the collective decision. Directions in this sense are
already being taken (Grandi et al, 2014).
8 Conclusion
We have studied strategic games where agents are endowed with designated goal
states and with the possibility of offering side-payments to their fellow agents
in order to influence their decision-making. The perspective we have taken inte-
grates the framework of strategic games with goals, a generalisation of the boolean
games studied in artificial intelligence, with that of endogenous games with side-
payments, studied in game theory. We have seen that the resulting games display
specific properties that make them worth studying in their own sake (Propositions
1, 2, 3 and 4) and the classical results available on Nash equilibria survival do not
generalise (Proposition 6). We have however provided sufficient conditions that
Nash equilibria need to have in order to survive (Proposition 7), independently
of the number of agents involved. We have also shown that, with an appropriate
use of taxation mechanisms, every outcome consistent with agents’ goals can be
turned into a surviving Nash equilibrium (Algorithm 1). Future research efforts
17 The models adopted in (Bonzon et al, 2009a) are very close to the original account of
boolean games given in (Harrenstein et al, 2001), where boolean games can be seen as a simple
version of the ones defined here, but with no cost function. Under these restrictions boolean
games become a special case of strategic games.
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will be devoted to studying the interaction between side-payments in strategic
games with goals and more realistic taxation mechanism that carry out imperfect
redistribution of wealth, i.e., extract payoff units to some agents at certain out-
comes redistributing a part of it to possibly different agents at possibly different
outcomes. Attention will also be paid to the relation with mechanism design and
the algorithmic properties of the procedures under study.
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